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THE LIAR PARADOX IS A REAL PROBLEM
NIK WEAVER
1.
I recently wrote a book [11] which, not to be falsely modest, I think says some
important things about the foundations of logic. So I have been dismayed to see
potential readers dismiss it after the first few pages, which discuss the liar paradox.
Their probable opinion on that subject was eloquently expressed (not in reference
to my book) by the physicist Lubosˇ Motl [6]:
Some fruitless discussion is dedicated to the Liar Paradox, i.e. even
more futile attempts to assign a truth value to the sentence ‘this
sentence is false’. This sentence can’t be false because then its
negation would have to be right and the negation would imply that
the sentence is true; and vice versa. It can’t be true and false
at the same moment which means that it can’t be attributed any
particular truth value.
I think that most intelligent schoolkids understand the previous
paragraph. On top of that, one may add some adults’ interpre-
tations. First of all, there’s nothing wrong about a proposition’s
having an undefined truth value. Meaningless sentences can’t be
assigned truth values. That’s the case when the[y] fail to obey
some rules of grammar or syntax. But even if they do, they may
fail to obey other conditions, conditions linked to the ‘beef’ of our
axiomatic system.
This contradiction is avoided in any consistent framework to as-
sign truth values to some propositions because any such consistent
framework does forbid — has to forbid (in order to be consistent)
— such sentences. These requirements are reflected by special re-
finements such as the GB or ZF set theory that overcome a similar
paradox due to Bertrand Russell in Georg Cantor’s naive set theory
(which allowed a setM of all sets X such that X 6∈ X which makes
the question whether M ∈M equally paradoxical) . . .
The sequence of several paragraphs above really exhausts every-
thing one may say about the Liar Paradox . . .
I gather that this sort of view is quite widespread among mathematicians and even
logicians. So I felt it could be worthwhile to explain why it is wrong. My intended
audience is technically-minded people who think that the liar paradox is trivially
uninteresting. I understand that they come to the subject already frustrated that
anyone would even want to talk about it but I believe I can give them clear reasons
to reconsider their position.
Date: February 12, 2017.
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(I should acknowledge right off that Kripke’s ‘Jones versus Nixon’ example [5]
already convinced many philosophers of language to take these kinds of paradoxes
seriously. But I suppose it would not be as persuasive to a technically-minded
audience.)
2.
Motl’s comment about ZFC — the Zermelo-Frankel axiomatization of set theory
— is a good place to start. He is right that it overcomes the familiar paradoxes of
naive set theory, by formalizing set-theoretic reasoning in a way that accomplishes
two goals:
1. The paradoxes are blocked.
2. Ordinary unparadoxical reasoning is allowed.
But Motl’s vague reference to “any consistent framework to assign truth values to
some propositions” evades the following brute fact:
We have no comparable axiomatization of truth.
The vast technical literature on the subject contains many attempts, but it has
not yet produced a de facto standard formal system for reasoning about truth
that simultaneously blocks the liar paradox and retains ordinary unparadoxical
reasoning. Perhaps that in itself already gives some substance to my claim that the
liar paradox is a real problem.
Why has a workable formalization been so elusive?
3.
Is it due to incompetence? If so, then maybe there is an opportunity here for
someone unschooled in the subject, but with good sense, to put his mind to the
problem and clear everything up for us by formulating an axiomatic system that
does for truth what ZFC does for sets. It might be easy!
I am being facetious, but I have come to suspect that many mathematicians (of
whom I am one) actually do believe incompetence to be the primary explanation
of our lack of a good formalization of truth. Perhaps they know that philosophers
think they can trap them in the following way:
P: Consider the sentence ‘This sentence is not true’. Is it true or not?
M: It is neither true nor false, it has no truth value.
P: Aha, so in particular it is not true! But that is just what it says of itself!
and they have a rejoinder:
M: No, it does not ‘say’ anything. It is meaningless.
This simple comment apparently neutralizes any obstacle the liar paradox may
present to axiomatization. We can allow as valid a formal version of the sentence
‘the liar sentence is neither true nor false’ (something Motl affirms), but block any
subsequent inference of the liar sentence itself by simply forbidding it as a possible
assertion. That should dissolve the paradox, or so one might think. As the logician
Arnon Avron puts it [1],
THE LIAR PARADOX IS A REAL PROBLEM 3
Surely a meaningless sentence cannot say anything about anything,
in particular not about itself (or anything else). So relying on what
‘it says of itself’ depends on taking for granted that it is meaningful
. . . I do wonder now if I am missing something here, and if so - what
can it possibly be.
Needless to say, for me the ‘liar sentences’ of all types are indeed
completely meaningless, which is why I was never bothered by them
. . .
What can he possibly be missing? Term substitution.
4.
I will explain. It is not difficult.
A sentence is just a string of symbols, so let us work with strings. We can
legitimately say things like
‘sentence liar the’ is not a true sentence.
because ‘sentence liar the’ is not even a grammatical sentence. Or, equivalently, we
can say
The concatenation of the strings ‘sentence li’ and ‘ar the’ is not a
true sentence.
These two statements are trivially deducible from each other because the terms
‘sentence liar the’
and
The concatenation of the strings ‘sentence li’ and ‘ar the’
evaluate to the same string. Agreed? The first term directly names the string
in question, while the second constructs it by a simple operation. Thus the two
sentences can be inferred from each other by a basic property of equality. We can
call this kind of inference term substitution.
An example of term substitution in a mathematical context: from
17 = 15 + 2
and
17 is prime
we can infer
15 + 2 is prime
— in general, in any formal system that has an equality symbol, for any constant
terms s and t term substitution lets us derive the formula φ(t) from the formula
φ(s) plus the equality s = t.
Good. Now consider the following operation on strings. Given a string S, replace
every occurence of the symbol ‘#’ in S with the full string S itself, in quotes. Call
this operation quining. Thus, quining ‘abc’ just yields ‘abc’, while quining ‘ab#c’
yields ‘ab‘ab#c’c’. Then let L be the following sentence:
The string obtained by quining ‘The string obtained by quining #
is not a true sentence.’ is not a true sentence.
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Is L a true sentence?
Option 1: L is a true sentence. A moment’s thought shows that the string it
refers to is precisely itself. Since it is a true sentence, it does ‘say’ something, and
what it says it that it is not true. Contradiction.
Option 2: L is not a true sentence. The concern now is that this seems to be just
what L says. But as Avron points out, that suggestion takes it for granted that
L is meaningful. Can we agree that L is not meaningful, that it does not actually
‘say’ anything?
Not really. Let s be the term which simply quotes L verbatim, and let t be the
term
The string obtained by quining ‘The string obtained by quining #
is not a true sentence.’
Then s and t evaluate to the same string, namely the sentence L, so we can go from
s is not a true sentence.
— the premise of option 2 — to
t is not a true sentence.
— the paradoxical sentence L itself — by merely substituting t for s.
Once you accept that L is not a true sentence, you can immediately infer
L by term substitution.
Thus, in forbidding us from infering L from the statement that L is not true, the
Motl/Avron position commits itself to the conclusion that a sentence of the form
s is not a true sentence.
is meaningful and true, but another sentence of the identical form
t is not a true sentence.
— where s and t are concrete syntactic terms which evaluate to the same string —
is meaningless.
To see how this would look in a formal setting, suppose ordinary Peano arithmetic
is augmented with a “truth” predicate symbol T for which we know T [n¯] ↔ φ for
any sentence φ with Go¨del number n. Then we can produce a formal version Q of
the quining operation, which, given the Go¨del number n of a formula φ(x) with one
free variable, returns the Go¨del number of the formula φ(n¯). For a suitable choice
of n, the Go¨del number of the sentence
¬T (Q[n¯])
is Q[n¯] itself. This is just Tarski’s “truth” version of Go¨del’s construction of a
sentence that denies its own provability. Letting k be the numerical value of Q[n¯],
by the truth property T [k¯] is equivalent to ¬T (Q[n¯]), and by term substitution the
latter is equivalent to ¬T [k¯]. Which is a contradiction.
I suspect that anyone who has actually worked with formal theories of truth
would immediately reject the Motl/Avron idea as a non-starter, for just this reason.
5.
I used the word ‘quining’ for the construction discussed above because it is similar
to one introduced by W. V. O. Quine [7]. It is essentially a natural language version
of the construction employed by Go¨del in his proof of the first incompleteness
theorem. (Incidentally, I learned about it from Douglas Hofstadter’s delightful book
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Go¨del, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid [4], which I read as an intelligent
schoolkid. Did Motl, I wonder?)
I hope there is no question about the legitimacy of the quining operation. There
is nothing wrong with it: if strings are encoded numerically as Go¨del numbers, it
becomes a primitive recursive function.
Remember, I am trying to explain why it is so hard to formalize our intuitive no-
tion of truth in the same way that ZFC formalizes our intuitive notion of sets. Any
formal system for reasoning about strings with sufficient number-theoretic resources
to express primitive recursive functions is going to have a quining operation. If it
also has a truth predicate that can be applied to its own sentences, and it allows
term substitution, then it cannot accomodate the Motl/Avron position.
6.
So as much as we want to say that liar sentences have no truth value, and in
particular are not true, if substitution of equivalent terms is a legal deductive move,
then this position leads to contradictions. The people who take the liar paradox
seriously are not just a bunch of fools. There are real issues here which casual
critics have not appreciated.
I suppose one could bite the bullet and affirm that mere term substitution can
sometimes turn a meaningful sentence into a meaningless one. But I would be
surprised to see anyone pursue this direction with much enthusiasm. You then have
to face up to the problem of how we can tell which instances of term substitution
are legitimate.
Kripke [5] pointed out that in the natural language setting there are many seem-
ingly unremarkable sentences which are meaningful under most circumstances, but
which can become paradoxical if the empirical facts are unfavorable. There are
no empirical facts in pure mathematics, but essentially the same problem is still
present. If the language contains a truth predicate, then for most numerical terms
t a sentence of the form
The numerical value of t is not the Go¨del number of a true sentence.
may be straightforwardly true or false. But if the language accomodates elementary
number theory, then there will be cases where, for example, t evaluates to the Go¨del
number of that very sentence, rendering it paradoxical. It would not be hard for
someone with knowledge of elementary logic to design a primitive recursive term t
that contains a numerical parameter n, and which evaluates to the Go¨del number
of the sentence ‘2 + 2 = 4’ if n is prime but which, if n is composite, evaluates to
the Go¨del number of a sentence that affirms that the numerical value of t is not
the Go¨del number of a true sentence. The moral is that no simple syntactic filter
is going to distinguish between ordinary and paradoxical truth assertions.
7.
I do not mean to suggest that there are no other options; there are plenty. One
might hope to find a way out by ascribing truth not to sentences but rather to
the abstract “propositions” those sentences (allegedly) express. Or by developing
the idea that truth is situational, or indeterminate, or subject to revision. Or more
radically, by adopting a non-classical logic, or even by accepting that some sentences
can somehow simultaneously be both true and not true. In my experience, when a
defender of the Motl/Avron view is shown the term substitution problem, his first
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reaction is usually to make one of these moves. Suffice it to say that they have all
been thoroughly investigated, and they all have serious problems.
One principal difficulty is that attempts to resolve the liar paradox often turn
out to involve concepts “which, if allowed into the object language, generate new
paradoxes that cannot be dissolved by the account in question” [3], a circumstance
that is known in the liar literature as the “revenge problem”. For instance, in
response to the idea that the truth of a sentence may depend on the situation in
which it is stated, we can formulate the sentence “This sentence is not true in any
situation”. Sentence of this sort are known in the literature as “strengthened liars”.
In a word, my message to the intended audience for this paper is: whatever
simple idea you have for an easy resolution of the liar paradox — we’ve tried it,
and it doesn’t work.
8.
Surely the liar paradox is not important in itself. But to the extent that it stands
in the way of a satisfactory theory of truth, and that this is a goal we care about,
it matters.
Why should we care about having a satisfactory theory of truth? At this point
it may be helpful to look at the way truth ascriptions can appear in mathematical
reasoning, so we can see what is at stake.
By way of example, consider the formal system of Peano Arithmetic (PA). Al-
though the Peano axioms are quite simple, they are surprisingly strong — most
ordinary number-theoretic reasoning can ultimately be reduced to them. But not
all number-theoretic reasoning: as Go¨del showed, if PA is consistent then it can-
not prove its own consistency. More precisely, it cannot prove a certain number-
theoretic sentence, Con(PA), which arithmetically expresses the consistency of PA.
Despite this, most of us think that PA is consistent. Why? How can we be sure
that there is no formal derivation of the sentence ‘0 = 1’ in PA? Because it has
a model. If all of the Peano axioms are true in their intended interpretation in
the natural numbers, and if the inferential rules of PA preserve truth, then we can
argue by induction on the length of a derivation that every theorem provable in PA
is true in its intended interpretation in N. Since it is not true that zero equals one
in N, the sentence ‘0 = 1’ cannot be a theorem of PA.
This kind of reasoning requires a functioning concept of truth. If our truth
concept were inconsistent then such reasoning could not be trusted.
9.
However, this threat to Peano arithmetic might not be so serious, because it
is possible to explicitly define what we mean by truth in this particular setting,
and to thereby ensure that we have the tools we need to make the consistency
argument. That is, without referencing any general concept of truth, we can define
what it means for a formal sentence in the language of arithmetic to be true in N.
The definition goes by recursion on the length of the sentence. We start by saying
under what conditions on s and t an atomic sentence of the form s = t is true in
N, where s and t are numerical terms, and then we proceed inductively. (A ∧B is
true in N if both A and B are true in N, etc.) This construction certainly requires
some infinitary resources in order to deal with quantifiers — indeed, more infinitary
resources than are available within PA — but it does not require any prior concept
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of truth. And once we know what it means for a formula of arithmetic to be true
in N, we can make the argument for the consistency of PA sketched above.
Thus, we can quarantine the idea of arithmetical truth, give it a formal definition,
and put it to work without having to worry about any liar related issues. This
formal definition is rigorous and philosophically unproblematic (at least, modulo
concerns about infinity, which are a separate matter). Moreover, it generalizes to
any formal language with a set model, a result due to Tarski and Vaught [10].
10.
We have made definite progress. The pessimism of our earlier discussion, with
its implication that an axiomatic theory of truth cannot hope to satisfy even the
humblest conditions we might impose, has been countered by a definite theorem
which effectively states that in a wide variety of settings a rigorous definition of
truth is available.
The contrast is striking: when we try to analyze truth as a universal concept,
we just get one contradiction after another, but when we localize to any specific
formal language that has a well-defined set-theoretic interpretation, we can give an
explicit, almost trivial construction of something that we intuitively recognize as a
truth predicate. The natural conclusion is that the global concept is fictional; all
we have are local truth predicates.
Another way to say this is that we should be thinking not in terms of a concept
of ‘truth’, but in terms of a concept of ‘truth predicate’. This was Tarski’s view.
That is, the right question to ask is not ‘What is truth?’, it is ‘What counts as a
truth predicate for a given language?’ And he has an answer to this question [8].
According to Tarski, the functional role of truth is encapsulated in the T-scheme
T (‘A’)↔ A,
where T (·) is a candidate truth predicate and A is to be replaced by any syntacti-
cally correct sentence. The classic example is ‘ ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only
if snow is white’. Tarski’s idea is to use the T-scheme, with A ranging over all the
sentences of some language, to say what it means for a predicate T (in formal terms,
a formula with one free variable) to count as a truth predicate for that language.
This predicate would itself typically belong not to the target language, but to some
metalanguage.
It may look as though the T-scheme trivializes truth, if all it tells us is that
asserting a sentence is the same as asserting its truth. But this equivalence gives
us the ability to, for example, say something about snow (that it is white) by
saying something about the syntactic string ‘snow is white’ (that it is true), and
depending on our ability to reason about and manipulate syntactic strings, this
can be a powerful tool. Most importantly, we can quantify over syntactic strings.
Recall the argument for the consistency of Peano arithmetic: it relied on general
principles like ‘For any sentences A and B, if A and A → B are both true, then
so is B.’ One needs a truth predicate to make statements like this, and one needs
the general fact, not any particular instance, to make the inductive argument for
consistency.
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11.
Tarski’s account seems to remove the mystery surrounding truth. On this view
truth is not some occult metaphysical quality; when we talk about ‘truth’ we are
merely talking about any predicate that makes the T-scheme work. The Tarski-
Vaught theorem shows that we can construct truth predicates in a variety of formal
settings, and the lesson of the liar paradox is that this is the best we can hope for:
nothing can function as a truth predicate globally. End of story.
Or is it? Many commentators have been uncomfortable with the idea that there
is no single, universal concept of truth. It seems wrong. The metalanguage in which
a Tarskian truth predicate appears can itself be the target of a new, broader truth
predicate, leading to the idea of hierarchies of truth predicates of ever-increasing
generality. Again, this violates our raw intuition of truth as a unitary quality.
A more focussed objection is that the T-scheme is, in fact, disastrously circular.
Just above I said, with intentional vagueness, that a truth predicate is one which
makes the T-scheme ‘work’. What this means is, precisely, that it must make
every instance of the T-scheme true. Yes. Affirming that the T-scheme holds for
a given predicate T requires the use of a preexisting truth predicate, just as much
as affirming the law ‘if A and A→ B are both true, then so is B’ does. Any single
instance of this law can be expressed without using truth, just by substituting
specific sentences in the template ‘if A and A → B then B’. But quantifying
over all A and B requires a truth predicate. The T-scheme is in exactly the same
situation. Any single instance can be expressed without using a truth predicate, but
you need a truth predicate to express that something happens for every sentence
A. That is just the kind of thing truth predicates are good for.
This is not a pedantic complaint. In order to use the T-scheme to say what
counts as a truth predicate, you need to use a truth predicate. Which is to say:
We cannot use the T -scheme to say what truth means without already
knowing what truth means.
More precisely, we cannot use it to say what truth means in a given context without
already knowing what it means in a broader context. I call this the Tarskian
catastrophe. It shows that we have not, after all, succeeded in eliminating truth as
a primitive notion. The problem is easy to miss because we are so used to using
truth to convert schemes into sentences that we may not even notice the need to
use it in that way here.
12.
Tarski was aware of this difficulty, and his response was to reframe the condition
in terms of each instance of the scheme not being true, but being formally provable
in some metasystem. In effect, we take all the separate instances of the T-scheme
as a collective definition, an axiom scheme. But this completely vitiates the idea of
truth. There is an essential difference between proving each instance of a scheme
and proving a single statement which implies every instance. If all we have is the
T-scheme as a scheme, then we have no basis to affirm that for all A and B, if A and
A→ B are both true, then so is B. The negation of this general law is consistent
with any finitely many instances of the T-scheme, and therefore the general law is
not a logical consequence of the T-scheme as a scheme.
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The problem is fundamental because practically the whole point of having a
truth predicate in mathematical settings is to enable ourselves to make general
statements about truth. If the T-scheme is verified in a piecemeal way then it can
only be used in a piecemeal way, which is to say, it cannot be used substantively.
In order to characterize truth using the T-scheme we have to find a way to
globally affirm every instance of the scheme, something Tarski’s dodge fails to
accomplish. This means that the liar paradox is still a problem, because it turns
out that we still require a global notion of truth, and that still runs afoul of the
paradox.
13.
One might ask why we even need the T-scheme when we already have the Tarski-
Vaught theorem which explicitly constructs a truth predicate for any interpreted
language. Why not just use this as a definition?
Because the Tarski-Vaught theorem does not actually do this. As stated, it only
applies to languages equipped with a set model, i.e., languages for which we have
a set which the variables of the language are understood as ranging over. (For
instance, in the case of PA the variables are supposed to range over the set N.)
But in mathematics we often want to make assertions about variables which range
over a proper class, a situation that would not be covered. One may be willing to
dismiss class models as unnecessary extravagance, but if we want to use the Tarski-
Vaught theorem as a definition of ‘truth predicate’ that option is not available.
This theorem itself refers to arbitrary set models, and hence requires for its own
expression a language with variables that range over all sets. This is a necessity,
not a luxury.
It would not be hard to generalize the theorem to apply to languages equipped
with class models, but in order to do this one would need to use a language with
variables that range over all classes, a language to which the theorem still would
not apply. Indeed, however broadly we generalize the Tarski-Vaught construction,
we can never get it to apply to the very language in which the generalization itself
is effected. For then this language would be able to supply its own truth definition
. . . leading to a liar paradox.
14.
I know how to solve these problems [11]. My idea is to segregate from truth
a distinct but related notion, the notion of assertibility. Informally, a sentence
is assertible if we have an unimpeachable right to affirm it. This is something
intuitionists have been very interested in, but their analysis of it seems wrong to
me. (They want it to replace the classical notion of truth, which they reject, but
they also think it satisfies the T-scheme, which would effectively make it a classical
truth predicate.) I do think they are right on one crucial point, that reasoning
about assertibility demands the use of intuitionistic logic.
This is not the place for a detailed explanation, but to summarize some of my
conclusions, I find that assertibility can be given a simple, elegant axiomatization,
one that is (at least in various limited settings) provably consistent. The assertibility
version of the liar paradox is defeated by rejecting some instances of the assertibility
T-scheme — a subtle point, because it hinges on an intuitionistic interpretation of
implication. It is assertibility, or constructive truth, which is, in my view, the global
10 NIK WEAVER
concept, while classical truth is, just as Tarski said, only something which makes
sense locally. The explanation for our naive intuition of truth as a unitary quality
is that it is actually an intuition for assertibility, or maybe that it involves some
equivocation between classical and constructive truth. The Tarskian catastrophe
is resolved by saying that T is a truth predicate for an interpreted language if all
instances of the T-scheme, with A ranging over the sentences of the language, are
assertible. Indeed, since it is truly global, the concept of assertibility is available
to handle any number of other tasks which classical truth, because of its inherently
local nature, cannot. A successful treatment of second order logic, for instance
— something which has been a problem since Frege’s approach was thwarted by
Russell’s paradox — now becomes possible. In short, I find that the constructive
notion of truth can be used to do all the things one wants classical Tarskian truth
to do that it cannot.
This is a grand claim, but I am confident of it. However, before one can even
start to understand such things, one has to get past this inane idea that the liar
paradox is not a real problem. It absolutely is.
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